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RETHINKING CAMPAIGN-FINANCE
REFORM: THE PRESSING NEED FOR
DEREGULATION AND DISCLOSURE
CECIL C. KUHNE, III*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The complexity of campaign-finance law-with its escalating
maze of legal prohibitions, restrictions, and disclosure
requirements-has developed to the point where it ranks second
only to the federal tax code. This is a poor testament indeed to the
First Amendment's astoundingly simple admonition that Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. Although the
Supreme Court recently deferred to Congress in its ability to
restrict campaign contributions,' the Court has also repeatedly
recognized that the First Amendment has "its fullest and most
urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for
political office." 2 Further, the Court has stated that it is the duty
of the Court to approach such restrictions "with the utmost
3
skepticism" and subject them to the "strictest scrutiny," and that
the very purpose of the First Amendment is "to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail." 4 One justice has aptly noted:
The federal election campaign laws, which are already.., so
voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no ordinary citizen dare
run for office, or even contribute a significant sum, without hiring
an expert advisor in the field, can be expected to grow more
voluminous, more detailed, and more complex in the years to comewith the objective of reducing the excessive
and always, always,
5
amount of speech.
Those opposed to the bureaucratic labyrinth of campaignfinance reform point out that donations to candidates and political

* Mr. Kuhne practices in the Dallas office of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P.

1. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 passim (2003).
2. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 214,
223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
3. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 (2000).
4. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FTC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
5. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 264 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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parties are in fact legitimate expressions of popular interest,6 and
that often the best way to discuss the political issues of the day in
the modern age is to publicize them through expensive television
ads. In the minds of these individuals, complex campaign-finance
regulation is not only undesirable, but ultimately futile. This is
due to the fact that previous congressional efforts to address
perceived electoral abuses have invariably been met with clever
maneuvers designed to circumvent that legislation, which in turn
has been followed by further laws to close the resulting loopholes,
7
and so on ad infinitum.

A far better solution is to totally deregulate the current
campaign-finance system, and in its place require complete and
widely accessible disclosure of all contributors and political
advertising.8 By shining the bright light of disclosure on those
contributing to politicians, their parties, and other political
messages, the public will clearly know whom the primary actors
are and what influence they are trying to exert. It is obvious that
increased campaign spending of all kinds results in a betterinformed electorate, because exposing corruption, untenable
platforms, or deficient character in a politician are vital in
educating voters. Competition in the marketplace of ideas should
be encouraged just as it is in the marketplace of goods. Justice
Scalia eloquently noted the philosophical basis for a laissez faire
attitude toward campaign contributions:
The premise of the First Amendment is that the American people
are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering
both the substance of the speech presented to them and its
proximate and ultimate source. If that premise is wrong, our
democracy has a much greater problem to overcome than merely the
influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises of democracy,

6. "[A]n attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech itself."

Id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

7. For a history of campaign-finance regulation, see Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 147-48 (2003) (holding that a ban on direct

corporate political contributions could be applied to a nonprofit advocacy
corporation); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437-39 (2001) (discussing the Court's first look at the
Federal Election Commission Act in 1971); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-10 (1982) (summarizing the history
of regulating political contributions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)
(per curiam) (the Federal Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate

federal elections); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S.
385, 402-04 (1972) (explaining the history of campaign finance reform); United
States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575-82 (1957) (concerns of

campaign finance date back to the early 1900s); United States v. Cong. of

Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1948) (earliest campaign finance reform

occurred in 1907).
8. For suggested changes, see infra Part VIII (discussing a simpler
approach to campaign finance reform).
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9
there is no such thing as too much speech.

II.

DEALING WITH POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Proposals for increasing limits on campaign contributions and
expenditures rely primarily on the proposition that money "buys"
elections and therefore exerts a powerful corrupting influence on
politicians. 10 As a result, the primary justification for campaignspeech restrictions is the relatively vague notions of "prevention of
corruption" and the so-called "appearance of corruption" of elected
officials.11 On this basis the Supreme Court upheld contribution
limitations if their purpose is one of reducing corruption, which is
traditionally defined as "the attempt to secure a political quid pro
12
Limits on
quo from current or potential officeholders."
contributions have thus been justified because they prevent both
the "actual corruption" threatened by large financial contributors
and the erosion of public confidence in the electoral process
13
through the "appearance of corruption."
At this point, a legitimate question is whether current law, as
extensive as it is, is insufficient to deal with this type of corruption
among politicians. After all, federal law does contain an intricate
web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, which
govern the acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by
public officials. 14 Under existing statutes, federal officials are
subject to severe criminal penalties if they solicit or accept a bribe
or illegal gratuity1 5 while participating, in their official capacity, in
16
a matter in which they have a personal financial interest, or if
they receive a supplementation of salary from any source outside
17
the federal government.
In spite of these comprehensive corruption statutes, the
Supreme Court has gone further and recognized a "different type

9. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
10. Contribution limits are said to be grounded in governmental interests
in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial
contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process
through the appearance of corruption." Nat'l. Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 208.
11. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. See also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 153-54;
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 388-89.
12. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297 (1981).
13. See Nat'l Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 208. See also Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 440-41.
14. See United States. v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 409 (1999).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c) (Supp. 2003). See also Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at
404.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2000). See also United States v. Miss. Valley Co., 364
U.S. 520, 548-49 (1961).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 209. See also Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 15866 (1990).
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of corruption" than the financial quid pro quo'--what the Court
terms the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas." 19
Campaign
reformers have thus successfully contended that: simply too much
money is spent on political advertising;20 while television ads may
enhance the quantity of speech, they diminish its quality; 2' and
the volume of advertising often drowns out those unable to
purchase countervailing ads. Yet none of this behavior requires
even a faint showing of demonstrable corruption. In the end, the
reformers succeeded in constructing a formidable array of
restrictions on campaign financing-and thus on political speech
itself.

III. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 197122 ("FECA"),
together with its 1974 amendments, 23 proposed an extensive
regime of campaign-finance regulation based primarily on
contribution limits to candidates. 24 The Act also sought to limit
total spending on House and Senate races by setting expenditure
limits on candidates. 25 In addition, it required public disclosure of
political contributions. 26
18. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).

19. Id. See also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441
(acknowledging that corruption extends beyond explicit cash-for-votes
agreements to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment"); Nixon, 528
U.S. at 389 ("[The Court has] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.").
20. See SMITH, infra note 80.
21. Justice Scalia argued in his dissent in McConnell: "[lit is not the proper
role of those who govern us to judge which campaign speech has 'substance'
and 'depth' (do you think it might be that which is least damaging to
incumbents?) and to abridge the rest." McConnell, 540 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431
(2000 & Supp. 2003)). The Act was called "by far the most comprehensive,
reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the
President, Vice-President, and members of Congress." Buckley v. Valeo, 519
F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)-(3) (1970 & Supp. IV). The Act also provided for
public financing of presidential campaigns, and established an effective
enforcement mechanism through the creation of the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC"). Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 609 (1970 & Supp. IV).
26. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000) (citing the statute in its modern form). This led to
the holding, in Buckley, that such disclosures "alert the voter to the interests
to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate
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In the landmark decision of Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme
Court held that many of the provisions of FECA were
impermissible under the First Amendment, 27 but the opinion did
assert that the government has a compelling (though vaguely
28
defined) interest in preventing the corruption of elected officials.
The Court eventually sustained the contribution restrictions,
admitting that such limits do in some ways infringe the First
Amendment, but finding that prevention of corruption was of
29
It
sufficient governmental interest to justify such infringements.
concerned the Court that large contributions might have the
potential to lead to quid pro quo corruption. 30 The Court stated
that contribution limits are permissible because they did not
"directly" infringe on the speech of the spender, 31 since they left
32
open alternate means for advocacy of political issues.
The Court in Buckley struck down restrictions on spending by
a candidate as unconstitutional, 33 which, the Court reasoned,
posed no real threat of corruption. 34
Furthermore, Buckley
rejected in the strongest possible language the notion that
government could restrict political speech in order to advance
political equality: "The concept that government may restrict the
speech of some element of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
35
Amendment."
A major purpose of the First Amendment, the Buckley Court
explained, was "to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."36 The Court conceded that contribution and expenditure
limitations "operate in an area of the most fundamental First
predictions of future performance in office" and "deter actual corruption and
avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity." 424 U.S. at 67.
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 54 ('We therefore hold that [the Act's] restriction
on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional.").
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 27-28.
30. Id. at 26-27.
31. "While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation
of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor." Id. at 20-21.
32. Contribution limits, the Court rationalized, entail only a "marginal
restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id.
at 20.
33. Id. at 19 ("The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent
substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and
diversity of political speech.").
34. Id. at 45 ("We find that the governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify [the Act's]
ceiling on independent expenditures.").
35. Id. at 48-49.
36. Id. at 14 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
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Amendment activities," 37 and thus such limitations were said to be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny, i.e., they must serve a
"compelling state interest" employing the "least restrictive
means."38 As a result, campaign contributions to candidates were
given less protection than independent expenditures in support of
a candidate. 39 To avoid concerns of vagueness, the Court held that
FECA could reach only communications that "expressly advocate"
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 40 Therefore,
the use of such terms as "Elect John Smith" constituted a bright
line between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy. ' 41 Issueadvocacy expenditures made independently of candidates had to
be reported to the public, but could not be limited. 42 Hence, this
unregulated "soft money" 43 could not be used for promotion of a
specific candidate, but could be directed toward more general
advertising whose effect was often the election or defeat of a
44
particular candidate.
IV. THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT

After the Buckley decision, the Federal Election Commission
("FEC") and others fought hard to close what they perceived as
numerous "loopholes" created by the case. The most aggressive of
these efforts was the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200245
("BCRA"). Among other things, the Act-commonly known as
McCain-Feingold after its tireless sponsors-banned soft-money
contributions that avoided federal rules because they were
nominally given to political parties, 46 and it restricted "phony issue
37. Id.
38. Id. at 25; Levine v. Supreme Court of Wis., 679 F. Supp. 1478, 1494

(W.D. Wis. 1988).
39. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 44 n.52; McConnell, 540 U.S. at126-28.
42. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
43. Soft money refers to unregulated and unlimited contributions made to
party organizations rather than particular candidates. It was designed to be
used only for "party-building" activities, such as voter-registration, but most of
it was in fact sent to state parties and then to individual campaigns.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-26.
44. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-46. Interestingly enough, a few years after the
passage of the 1974 amendments, incumbent reelection rates began to rise,
and incumbents increased their fund-raising advantage over challengers. Id.
at 33 n.34. Total spending on congressional campaigns also continued to
increase, and special interests, instead of declining, appeared to grow in
importance. Id.
45. See Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (containing a series of
amendments to FECA). See also 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000 & Supp. 2003); The
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151; 47 U.S.C. § 315. See also other
portions of the United States Code, such as 18 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. 2003); 36
U.S.C. §§ 510-511.
46. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(b) (Supp. 2003).
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ads," which purportedly advanced a cause, but which were
47
actually an attack on a particular candidate.
Congress claimed that BCRA sought principally to address
the potential for corruption of federal officeholders created by softmoney donations and by the growing use of corporate and union
funds for communications designed to influence elections.
According to the reformers, the rising tide of soft money had all
but eviscerated the limits on contributions. The Act's other main
purpose was to forbid electioneering advertising in the sixty days
48
before a general election and thirty days before a primary.
The provisions of BCRA were challenged, and the Supreme
Court in McConnell v. FEC upheld substantially all of the Act.
The Court found by a narrow five-to-four majority that the
loopholes in campaign-finance law had indeed done damage, and
that contributions of soft money give rise to corruption and the
appearance of corruption.4 9 The Court ruled that Congress had
the power to re-address these wrongs, since the resulting
restrictions did not impermissibly infringe the rights of free speech
or free association. 50 McConnell strongly signaled that free speech
can be diminished pursuant to congressional efforts to cleanse the
political system of the so-called corrupting influence of campaign
money, no matter how vaguely defined that corruption might be. 51
Therefore, the opinion left in place the sweeping prohibition on
soft money, 52 as well as a ban on funds for electioneering
communications that mention candidates' names in the weeks
before an election. 53 In the end, McConnell lent support to further
"anti-circumvention" efforts by Congress, suggesting that
whatever methods interest groups devise to avoid BCRA can be
54
curtailed by additional legislation.
However, not all members of the Court agreed. Perhaps
Justice Scalia best expressed the voice of such concerns when he
stated:
It should be obvious, then, that a law limiting the amount a person
can spend to broadcast his political views is a direct restriction on
speech. That is no different from a law limiting the amount a
newspaper can pay its editorial staff or the amount a charity can
47. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(I), (f)(3)(C) (Supp. 2003).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A).
49. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154.
50. See id. ("In sum, there is substantial evidence to support Congress'
determination that large soft-money contributions to national political parties
give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption.").
51. Id. at 144-47.
52. Id. at 154.
53. Id. at 201-03.
54. See id. at 224 ("We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last
congressional statement on the matter."). Justices Stevens and O'Connor
state: 'Money, like water, will always find an outlet." Id.
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pay its leafletters. It is equally clear that a limit on the amount a
candidate can raise from any one individual for the purpose of
speaking is also a direct limitation on speech. That is no different
from a law limiting the amount a publisher can accept from any one
shareholder or lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any
55
one advertiser or customer.
V.

LEVEL OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

The Supreme Court announced in Buckley that restrictions of
political contributions and expenditures would be upheld only if
they achieved a compelling governmental interest by the least
restrictive means.5 6 Buckley concluded that both contributions
and expenditures function in an area of "the most fundamental
First Amendment activities," and one in which the Constitution
affords the "broadest protection" for individual expression and the
"fundamental" right to associate.57
Applying an "exacting
scrutiny" level of review, the Buckley court distinguished between
contribution limits and expenditure limits. 58 Contribution limits,
said the Court, entail "only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication"5 9 because
the "transformation of contributions into political debate involves
speech by someone other than the contributor."60
Expenditure
limits, on the other hand, represent "substantial rather than
merely theoretical restraints on the quality and diversity of
political speech." 61
Buckley's diluted scrutiny for campaign
contributions was based on the grounds that contributions involve
only symbolic speech by the contributor, that further expression is
contingent on speech by someone other than the contributor, and
62
that the burdens imposed were marginal.

55. Id. at 254-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "To
reach today's decision, the Court surpasses Buckley's limits and expands
Congress' regulatory power. In so doing, it replaces discrete and respected
First Amendment principles with new, amorphous, and unsound rules, rules
which dismantle basic protections for speech." Id. at 287 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. 424 U.S. at 25.
57. Id. at 14-15.
58. See id. at 16 ("[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of
a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a
nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.").
59. Id. at 20-21.
60. Id. at 21.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 21-22. The Court in Beaumont explained that contribution limits
are subject to a relaxed standard of review because "[wihile contributions may
result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association ...the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by
someone other than the contributor." 539 U.S. at 161-62.
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The Court in McConnell also maintained that the less
rigorous standard of review shows proper deference to Congress'
ability to "weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in
which it enjoys particular expertise"6 3 and provides Congress with
"sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about
circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of
the political process." 64 The dissenters in McConnell, on the other
hand, urged a return to strict scrutiny for all restrictions on
political speech and association, including those on campaign
65
contributions, express advocacy, and corporate or union speech.
VI. FALSE

PREMISES OF CONTRIBUTION

LIMITS

The basic justification for campaign-finance reform is the
reduction in corruption that money allegedly engenders, and the
resulting restrictions seem to rest ultimately on the premise that
legislators should be responsible to a higher (and curiously
undefined) notion of the "public good" that somehow exists apart
from the views of any particular group of voters. But this is an
untenable position, for elections are an exchange between
candidates and the citizens who elect them, and every candidate
necessarily offers something to the voter in exchange for being
elected. This exchange is part of the fabric of a representative
democracy, as is the influence that it necessarily creates. Falsely
egalitarian notions that the speech of persons and groups should
have equal influence indicate fundamental misunderstandings of
the First Amendment. Each person may have only one vote, but it
has never been seriously suggested that the speech of each person
should be equally influential; otherwise, the views of politicians
would have to be based solely on opinion polls. As one justice has
observed:
[It is considered corruptive behavior by some campaign reformers]
that corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, will be able to
convince voters of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently,
winning in the marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that "the
ultimate good" has been "reached by free trade in ideas," or that the
speaker has survived "the best test of truth" by having "the
66
thought... get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
Opponents of soft money believe that it invites wholesale
evasion of contribution limits. But that is exactly what one would
expect when citizens are prohibited from contributing directly to
candidates of their choice. Because soft money goes to parties, not
candidates, the likelihood of the kind of quid pro quo corruption

63.
64.
65.
66.

540 U.S. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 265 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 274 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that is said to justify contribution limits does not occur. After all,
citizens contribute to political parties to advance the ideas for
which these parties stand, and these contributions in turn
encourage lively and productive political debates.
It is commonly presumed that contributions unfairly
influence how a politician will vote, but it is just as logical to
assume that contributors favor candidates who agree with them in
the first place.
Besides, adopting an unpopular position in
exchange for a donation is generally unwise for a politician, for it
is votes-not money-which ultimately win elections. It therefore
makes little sense for a candidate to betray his personal
convictions, lose the support of his party, and offend public opinion
in order to obtain a contribution. Additionally, it is hardly
inappropriate for a legislator to vote in ways that please his
constituents, who in turn raise future campaign donations. 67
Furthermore, it has been repeatedly shown that outspending one's
opponent does not guarantee success on election night. Finally,
disgruntled voters can always register their disapproval at the
next election.
Naturally, the lower the contribution limit, the more difficult
it is for a candidate to raise money quickly. Raising campaign
funds from a large number of small contributors clearly benefits
incumbents who have in place a list of past contributors. But in
an unrestricted system, a challenger might be able to propose
bolder solutions and rely on a handful of donors who provide
"start-up capital" for the campaign, thus adding competition to the
race.
Implicit in the justification for reform is the notion that only
expenditures of money are regulated, not speech itself.6S But the
right to speak is hardly ineffective if it does not include the
financial ability to make it possible. 69 Representative democracies
67. As Justice Scalia concluded in McConnell:
It cannot be denied, however, that corporate (like noncorporate) allies
will have greater access to the officeholder, and that he will tend to
favor the same causes as those who support him (which is usually why
they supported him). That is the nature of politics-if not indeed
human nature-and how this can properly be considered "corruption"
(or "the appearance of corruption") with regard to corporate allies and
not with regard to other allies is beyond me.
Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. "These property rights, [to fund speech by proxy] however, are not
entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases." Nixon,
528 U.S. at 399. But Buckley stated: "[Tihis Court has never suggested that
the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates
itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
69. Justice Scalia noted in McConnell that: "[Where the government
singles out money used to fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting
against speech as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a
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70
are based on political parties, and these parties need resources.
The freedom to associate with others for the dissemination of
ideas-by pooling financial resources for political expression-is
The Buckley Court
an important aspect of free speech. 71
acknowledged that contributions enable "like-minded persons to
72
pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals."
Justice Scalia likewise remarked in McConnell:

In the modern world, giving the government power to exclude
corporations from the political debate enables it effectively to muffle
the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the
economy and the most passionately held social and political views.
People who associate-who pool their financial resources-for
purposes of economic enterprise overwhelmingly do so in the
corporate form; and with increasing frequency, incorporation is
chosen by those who associate to defend and promote particular
ideas-such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
Rifle Association. 73
VII. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM

Justice Kennedy noted the dramatic and far-reaching impact
of campaign-finance legislation on the ability of political parties to
engage in public discourse:
The many and varied aspects of [campaign-finance] regulations
impose far greater burdens on the associational rights of the parties,
their officials, candidates, and citizens than do regulations that do
no more than cap the amount of money persons can contribute to a
political candidate or committee. The evidence shows that national
parties have a long tradition of engaging in essential associational
activities, such as planning and coordinating fundraising with state
and local parties, often with respect to elections that are not federal

book was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore." 540 U.S. at
252 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. The Court in Buckley recognized that money is necessary for political
discourse:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money.
424 U.S. at 19.
71. The Supreme Court has held that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee the "freedom to associate with others for the common
advancement of political beliefs and ideas" and that this freedom encompasses
the right to "associate with the political party of one's choice." Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
72. 424 U.S. at 22.
73. 540 U.S. at 257-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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in nature. This strengthens the conclusion that the regulations now
74
before us have unprecedented impact.
While it is true that on its face all candidates-incumbents
and challengers-are treated equally in such reform, incumbents
are inherently favored. It has been shown that incumbents raise
about three times as much unrestricted "hard money" as do their
challengers. Further, national-party funding, which is severely
limited by the Act, is more likely to assist cash-strapped
challengers than incumbents with hard money.7 5 Justice Scalia
also comments:
To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits
criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in their
reelection bids. But as everyone knows, this is an area in which
evenhandedness is not fairness.
If all electioneering were
evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous
advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are limited to
the same quality of electioneering incumbents are favored. In other
words, any restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is
equally available to challengers and incumbents tends to favor
76
incumbents.

Without the ability to raise sufficient sums of money, the fate
of candidates then rests at the mercy of a select group of
professional journalists, who then have the power to interpret the
candidate's message. Less campaign spending simply reduces the
amount of communication; it does not necessarily eliminate its
negative aspects. In fact, candidates who have reached their
spending limits are unable to respond when their opponents make
a last-minute barrage of unfair assaults. Attempts to exclude
money from politics only strengthen the position of those with nonmonetary resources, such as media access or campaign volunteers.
Although the access to such contributions is nominally the same
for all candidates, certain types of interest groups-and in turn
their choice of candidates-are thus favored.
Additionally, the complicated nature of campaign-finance
legislation has been used as political strategy. Sophisticated
political strategists now routinely file complaints with the FEC,
which are often the quickest and least expensive way to tarnish an
opponent's reputation or have him divert valuable resources
defending himself.
As for the future of such reform, Justice Thomas grimly
predicts that the news media, which also seek to influence
elections through editorials, may be the next target: "The chilling
endpoint of the Court's reasoning is not difficult to foresee:
74. Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 249-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 249 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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outright regulation of the press." 77 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
observes that restrictions upon the right of the electorate to pool
financial resources "threatens the existence of all political
Restrictions such as these would be serious
parties."78
consequences indeed.
But the underlying question persists: is too much money
79
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VIII. A PROPOSAL FOR DEREGULATION AND DISCLOSURE
It has become increasingly apparent that the regulatory
model of campaign reform which currently exists has failed to
achieve even its modest objectives. Present law restricts the
supply of funds (through contribution limits), but not demand
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law, it is no wonder that the current system intensified the race
for raising and spending money designed to persuade voters and
83
politicians.
77. Id. at 283. Justice Thomas also noted that under the reasoning of the
majority opinion, he could envision laws being passed and upheld that would
require print media to give equal time to opposing viewpoints. Id. at 284-85
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. The Court in Buckley saw increasing expenditures to be of no
consequence: "[The mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in
and of itself provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of
campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of federal
campaigns." 424 U.S. at 57.
80. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 41-42 (2001).
81. Id. at 42.
82. Justice Scalia noted in McConnell that even if the larger estimates of
campaign spending are considered, Americans have spent half as much as
they spend on movie tickets, and a fifth as much as they spend on cosmetics
and perfume. 124 S. Ct. at 262 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
83. A perfect example of this phenomenon is the recent proliferation of socalled "Section 527' groups, named for the section of the tax code which
exempts them from campaign-finance regulation. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.527.1

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:633

A simpler and more reasonable approach to campaign-finance
regulation is to remove the limits on campaign contributions and
instead mandate complete and readily accessible disclosure on all
contributions to candidates, their parties, and political
advertising. In this way, the political marketplace would be
disciplined by citizens exercising their franchise to vote, not a legal
thicket of arcane rules and zealous regulations.8 4 The country
experienced eminent success in deregulating transportation,
energy, and financial services. Thus, there is no reason to believe
that an unwieldy and ineffectual campaign-finance scheme
protects voters any better than past economic regulations
protected consumers.
As long as the law mandates full disclosure of all substantial
contributions to candidates and political parties and of all
significant political advertising,8 5 the voters themselves can decide
whether the fact that a candidate has been heavily supported by a
particular individual or group should weigh against his
candidacy.8 6 Justice Scalia has remarked in this regard:
Evil corporate (and private affluent) influences are well enough
checked (so long as adequate campaign-expenditure disclosure rules
exist) by the politician's fear of being portrayed as "in the pocket" of
so-called moneyed interests. The incremental benefit obtained by
muzzling corporate speech is more than offset by loss of the
information and persuasion that corporate speech can contain.
That, at least, is the assumption of a constitutional guarantee which
prescribes that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
87
speech.

Under this simplified proposal, all political contributions and
communications would be clearly revealed to the public through
the Internet and major metropolitan newspapers.8 8 The intent
here is not to create another bureaucracy, and it should be noted
that most of this easily compiled data is currently required by the
(2004).

84. A similar recommendation was introduced by Representative John
Doolittle. Citizen Legislature and Political Freedom Act, H.R. 3525, 108th
Cong. (2003).
85. The Court in Buckley observed: "A public armed with information about
a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any postelection special favors that may be given in return." 424 U.S. at 67.
86. As Justice Scalia stated in McConnell: "The use of corporate wealth
(like individual wealth) to speak to the electorate is unlikely to 'distort'
elections--especially if disclosure requirements tell the people where the
speech is coming from." 124 S. Ct. at 258 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. For example, the disclosure of contributors might be required on the
first day of each month in, say, the classified ads section of such national
newspapers as The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall
Street Journal.
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FEC. However, public knowledge of this information could be
significantly increased by making it even more conspicuous to even
the casual observer. In the process, the public would be wellinformed of those individuals and advocacy groups who are
contributing to particular politicians, political parties, and issue
Furthermore, the failed system of contribution
advertising.
stifling effects on free speech-could be
its
limits-with
eliminated.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The explicit wording of the First Amendment ensures that
individuals and organizations have a right to voice their opinions.
The government has no business attempting to equalize political
strength among society by restricting speech, even if disparities in
political influence appear. Despite claims of campaign-finance
reformers that regulation can rid the political system of
corruption, the suggestion that it is somehow corrupt to persuade
elected representatives to vote in a certain way is inane. Complete
disclosure of contributions and political activity allows the
electorate to be informed of any attempts at political maneuvering,
with any quid pro quo corruption by politicians to be prosecuted to
the fullest extent of the law.
The quantity and substance of campaign speech ought to be
determined by private choices. It has been the experience of our
democracy that free speech is in fact eventually judged on its
substance, rather than its sheer volume or immediate allure.
Through vibrant political debate-not a federal campaign
bureaucracy-the Constitution in the end wisely places its trust in
the public to select its representatives.

